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An increasing number of companies have begun to make efforts to treat their suppliers fairly as a part 
of wider corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. Few studies, however, have investigated the 
performance implications of such efforts for buying firms. This paper uses both organisational climate 
theory and social exchange theory to investigate (1) if buying firms' efforts in the form of a code of 
conduct for its procurement practitioners pay off, and (2) its mechanisms from the perspectives of 
procurement practitioners. We use a multi-method approach, combining analysis of survey data 
complemented by results from a behavioural experiment. First, survey data were gathered from 327 
Korean manufacturing companies and analysed using structural equation modelling. Second, the 
findings were complemented by a behavioural experiment involving 120 subjects. The results support 
the positive performance implications of fair supplier treatment in the form of codes of conduct for 
procurement practitioners. The paper also offers insights into how such efforts benefit buying firms, 
which is due to the trust in the buyer-supplier relationship fostered by the resulting ethical behaviours 
of procurement practitioners. 
 
Keywords: Procurement, Buyer–supplier relationship, Code of conduct, Organisational climate, 
Multi-method study, Social exchange theory 
 
Paper type: Research paper 
 
1. Introduction  
Buyers’ unfair treatment of suppliers (e.g. retrospective changing of contracts) has long been an issue 
calling for action (Pickard and Felsted, 2012; Schleper et al., 2017). Recent examples involving 
several British supermarkets and Korean manufacturers suggest that such practices are widespread 
(Bolton, 2015; Kwak, 2013; Wu, 2017). Nevertheless, an increasing number of companies have been 
making efforts towards the fair treatment of their suppliers as part of their social sustainability 
initiatives (Liu et al., 2012; Alghababsheh et al., 2018). One way in which this is implemented is by 
embedding codes of conduct for fair supplier treatment (Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply 
[CIPS] 2013a and 2013b) into procurement policies.  
To the best of our knowledge, however, only a few studies have investigated the performance 
implications of the fair treatment of suppliers (e.g. Brandon-Jones et al., 2010). Therefore, the present 
study seeks to fill this gap by investigating whether such efforts in the form of a code of conduct 
would bring performance benefits to buying firms. A code of conduct is one of the most popular 
means of achieving fair supplier treatment (Preuss, 2009). For example, Samsung Electronics’ 
procurement policy details a code of conduct for its procurement practitioners, prohibiting certain 
practices of unfair supplier treatment (Kim, 2013).   
A code of conduct is a facet of the organisational climate, and reflects policies, practices, and 
procedures as well as members’ shared perceptions attached to them (Greenhaus, 2007; Litzky and 
Schneider et al., 2013; Victor and Cullen, 1988). Organisational climate theory, therefore, was the 
primary theoretical lens of the present study’s investigation of the impact of codes of conduct on 
procurement practitioners’ ethical orientation. The secondary theoretical lens, social exchange theory, 
was then used to understand the link between procurement practitioners’ ethical orientation and the 
level of trust in their relationships with suppliers. As the final step, the link between the level of trust 
and buyers’ supply chain performance also was investigated. 
In this study, the “interpretation” multi-method design (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998) was 
used. The primary method entailed the analysis, by structural equation modelling (SEM), of data 
obtained from a survey of procurement practitioners at 327 Korean manufacturing companies. Using 
the secondary method, the primary method’s findings were confirmed and complemented based on an 
experiment involving 120 undergraduate students. The rationale for using a multi-method design is 
that the secondary, experimental component enabled the authors to study human behaviour directly 
(Bendoly et al., 2006), which would not have been possible by the primary method (survey-data 
analysis) alone. 
Our findings suggest that a buying firm’s effort to treat its suppliers fairly (in the form of a 
code of conduct) is positively related to its supply chain performance. This is due to the trust in the 
buyer–supplier relationship, fostered by the resulting fair behaviours of the practitioners complying 
with such codes. However, the code will be effective only for regulating procurement practitioners’ 
behaviours that demonstrate low-level ambiguity, which is an important condition for drafting an 
effective code and monitoring its compliance.  
 
2. Theoretical Development  
2.1. Organisational climate and a code of conduct for procurement practitioners 
In this study, the organisational climate theory was used as the initial theoretical lens through which 
the impact on procurement professionals of a firm’s efforts to treat its suppliers fairly (based on a 
code of conduct) was analysed. In the field of psychology, the influence of environmental variations 
on individual behaviours has been investigated using the organisational climate theory (Carr, 2007). 
Organisational climate refers to “the shared perceptions of and the meaning[s] attached to the policies, 
practices, and procedures employees experience” (Schneider et al., 2013). Empirical evidence 
suggests that the organisational climate is related to members’ behaviours and attitudes, such as job 
satisfaction (Schnake, 1983), turnover (Steel et al., 1990; Demirtas and Akdogan, 2015), and 
dysfunctional job behaviours (Cole et al., 1997). The organisational climate concerning members’ 
perceptions of an organisation’s ethical practices and procedures (Martin and Cullen, 2006; Tseng and 
Fan, 2011) is called the “ethical climate”. Scholars often extend the scope of ethical climate beyond 
the common perception among members to incorporate actual rules/procedures such as codes of 
conduct (Litzky and Greenhaus, 2007; Victor and Cullen, 1988; Nedkovski et al., 2017).  
A firm’s ethical climate is closely related to its members’ behaviours/assessments in/for 
ethically dilemmatic situations (Litzky and Greenhaus, 2007; Schwepker et al., 1997; Tseng and Fan, 
2011; Cheng and Wang, 2015). The reason is that companies’ ethical climates, including codes of 
conduct, can provide members with guidance for acceptable behaviour when they are faced with 
ethical dilemmas; an example might be an opportunity for a procurement manager to gain unfairly 
from his or her company’s supplier using ethically dubious practices (Galbreath, 2010; Schwepker et 
al., 1997). Companies have various means of encouraging their employees to behave more ethically, 
for example in treating suppliers fairly (Hill et al., 2009), and a code of conduct, therefore, is one of 
the most used means of achieving this (Preuss, 2009).  
Generally, a code of conduct for procurement practitioners exists as a part of either their 
corporate code of conduct or their procurement policy (Jenkins, 2001; Preuss, 2010). There is a great 
deal of variance among companies in terms of the details (Kolk and Tulder, 2002; Preuss, 2010). A 
code of conduct takes the form of either comprehensive manuals containing detailed instructions or 
general guidelines covering principles only (Preuss, 2010). Ideally, a code should spell out rules and 
values (Badenhorst, 1994; Tucker et al., 1999) in detailing guidelines for procurement-related 
activities, because unethical behaviour is more likely to be reduced thereby (Badenhorst, 1994). A 
code also needs to be accompanied by a firm’s efforts to explicitly disseminate and emphasise it and 
to reward compliance to it and punish deviance from it (Litzky and Greenhaus, 2007).  
Such codes tend to incorporate more than one ethical dimension such as integrity or fairness 
(Tucker et al., 1999). The CIPS (2013a and 2013b) proposed that a code for procurement practitioners 
should set out acceptable personal behaviours related to various aspects of the buyer–supplier 
relationship, including transparency and fairness in dealing with suppliers, the use of buyer power, 
and payment terms. Regarding the fair treatment of suppliers, which is this paper’s main theme, the 
Institute of Supply Chain Management and the CIPS have both published standards, covering issues 
such as courtesy, fairness, transparency, and confidentiality, for dealing with suppliers (Preuss, 2009; 
Theodorakopoulos et al., 2015). 
 
2.2. Procurement practitioners and the fair treatment of suppliers 
As discussed above, one of the main means of achieving fair supplier treatment is a code of conduct, 
which is intended to curb procurement practitioners’ unethical behaviours towards suppliers. 
Procurement practitioners are the main channels through which relationships with suppliers are 
established, developed, and maintained (Charvet and Cooper, 2011; Chen et al., 2009; Mentzer et al., 
2000). This means that some enablers of successful buyer–supplier relationships often reside at the 
interpersonal level (Mentzer et al., 2000), including various traits of procurement practitioners, such 
as skills and attitudes (Charvet and Cooper, 2011, Ha et al., 2011, Tangpong et al., 2010). 
Considering this, a firm’s efforts towards achieving fair supplier treatment require the significant 
involvement of its procurement practitioners (e.g. Carter and Jennings, 2002). 
Traditionally, procurement practitioners are entrusted with spending a company’s budget on 
resource acquisitions (Razzaque and Hwee, 2002). Their role has now evolved to encompass strategic 
activities such as relationship management (Badenhorst, 1994; Turner et al., 1995). Such 
empowerment, extended responsibilities, and the pressure to perform may lead procurement 
practitioners to treat suppliers unfairly, which would have negative consequences, such as trust 
erosion, for a buyer–supplier relationship (Kumar et al., 1995). For this reason, we considered a 
procurement practitioner’s “ethical orientation”— which refers to an individual’s predisposition or the 
preferred cognitive framework in which an individual views, assesses, and responds to ethical issues 
(Brady and Wheeler, 1996; Reynolds, 2006) — as a key factor in understanding the performance 
implications of buying firms’ efforts to achieve fair supplier treatment in the form of codes of conduct.  
The ethical orientation of an individual is a multidimensional concept encompassing 
utilitarianism and formalism (Brady and Wheeler, 1996; Pearsall and Ellis, 2011). Individuals with a 
utilitarian-leaning ethical orientation tend to assess ethically dilemmatic situations by examining their 
outcomes, such as possible benefits (Brady, 1985), whereas those with a strong formalistic orientation 
are likely to focus on consistent conformity to patterns or rules (Brady and Wheeler, 1996) and the 
morality of each situation (Pearsall and Ellis, 2011). There is empirical evidence that individuals’ 
ethical orientations are related to their unethical behaviours (Brady and Wheeler, 1996; Treviño et al., 
2006).  
 
2.3. The fair treatment of suppliers and supplier trust 
Social exchange theory argues that a basic motivation for interaction is to seek rewards and avoid 
punishment from an exchange (Bandura, 1986; Emerson, 1976; Griffith et al., 2006; Narasimhan et al., 
2009). The behaviours/attitudes of an exchange partner are determined by the difference between the 
rewards and the cost/penalty of an interaction (Bandura, 1986; Emerson, 1976; Griffith et al., 2006). 
In other words, the level of justice or fairness perceived by a supply chain partner greatly influences 
its relational attitude/behaviours towards its counter-part (Griffith et al., 2006; Narasimhan et al., 
2009). Social exchange theory is comprised of a series of propositions that motivate the 
attitude/behaviours of an individual or company; those are: (1) success proposition, (2) reward 
proposition, (3) value proposition, (4) rationality proposition, and (5) aggression proposition (Griffith 
et al., 2006; Narasimhan et al., 2009).  
A firm formally embedding a code of conduct for fair supplier treatment in its procurement 
policy signals its commitment to refrain from unethical behaviours undermining supplier fairness 
(Griffith et al., 2006; Hemmert et al., 2016). One of the important relational outcomes of such 
behaviours in an exchange relationship is “trust” (Griffith et al., 2006; Hemmert et al., 2016; 
Narasimhan et al., 2009; Treviño et al., 2006). The trust-fostering role of fair supplier treatment can 
be explained from the success proposition and value position. Initially, such efforts by a buying firm 
would signal to its suppliers that they are valued and respected (Korsgaard and Roberson, 1995). 
Moreover, the resulting supplier behaviours would reflect a desire to continue to receive such benefits, 
thus signalling back to the buyer an intention to interact further (Heide and Miner, 1992; Griffith et al., 
2006). Through further (positive) interactions, trust in the form of relational capital starts to 
accumulate in the relationship over time (Carey et al., 2011; Krause et al., 2007; Son et al., 2016). 
Trust is a form of relational governance mechanism that reduces fear of opportunism (Narayanan et 
al., 2015; Ojala and Hallikas, 2006). It an important factor in a successful buyer-supplier relationship, 
specifically by (1) encouraging collaborative behaviours of exchange partners (Uzzi, 1997; Zaheer et 
al., 1998), and (2) reducing the needs for costly contractual mitigation mechanisms as well as the 
costs of monitoring/enforcing compliance (Dyer, 1997; Dyer and Chu, 2003).  
3. Conceptual Models and Hypotheses 
We first investigated whether a buying firm’s code of conduct for fair supplier treatment is related to 
the ethical orientations of its procurement practitioners. This was followed by an investigation of the 
mediating role of the ethical orientation of the procurement practitioners in fostering mutual trust. As 
the second step, the experimental design allowed us to test the complementary hypothesis regarding 
the impact of such a code of conduct on “actual human behaviours,” which was not possible to test 







Figure 1. Research model 
 
According to the organisational climate theory, a firm’s ethical climate, as generated by, for 
example, its code of conduct, influences how its employees perceive and make decisions related to 
ethical dilemmas (Elango et al., 2010; Goebel et al., 2012; Schwepker et al., 1997; Victor and Cullen, 
1988). The lack of a clear ethical climate — for example, the absence of a code of conduct for fair 
supplier treatment — means that there are no clear guidelines for procurement practitioners 
concerning what is and is not acceptable behaviour towards their suppliers. When a procurement 
practitioner in such a company is faced with an opportunity to gain unfairly from its suppliers, the 
lack of a reference point makes it difficult for the formalistic dimension of the practitioner’s ethical 
orientation to be used to assess the situation. Conversely, the presence of a clear code of conduct in a 
procurement policy informs procurement practitioners about unacceptable behaviour in terms of 
treatment of their suppliers as well as the consequences of such as breach.  
This means that when faced with an ethically dilemmatic situation, they are more likely to use 
a formalistic ethical orientation, focusing on compliance with rules (Brady and Wheeler, 1996) and 
morality (Pearsall and Ellis, 2011), to assess the situation. During the initial stage of this research, 
publicly available procurement policies were searched and procurement practitioners were contacted 
to determine the prevalence of codes of conduct for fair supplier treatment, as well as the contents of 
such codes. We found that these codes fell under two broad categories: ensuring (1) fair supplier 
involvement in decision-making (procedural justice) and (2) fair supplier returns (distributive justice). 
The following is, therefore, hypothesised:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive relationship between the existence of a code of conduct for 
“supplier procedural justice” in a buying firm’s procurement policy and the level of formalistic ethical 
orientation of the procurement practitioner. 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a positive relationship between the existence of a code of conduct for 
“supplier distributive justice” in a buying firm’s procurement policy and the level of formalistic 
ethical orientation of the procurement practitioner. 
 
As discussed earlier, the presence of a code of conduct would make the ethical orientation of 
a procurement practitioner lean towards “formalistic”, since it provides a reference point for 
acceptable behaviours, as well as punishment for breaches. Considering that the ethical orientation 
influences an individual’s view and responses to ethical issues (Brady and Wheeler, 1996; Reynolds, 
2006), the resulting behaviour of a procurement manager with the formalistic ethical orientation 
would be fairer towards suppliers. This is because she or he would be more likely to choose fairer 
behaviour towards their supplier, since such actions comply with the code. Therefore, it is 
hypothesised that:  
 
Hypothesis 1c: There is a positive relationship between the existence of a code of conduct for 
“supplier procedural justice” in a buying firm’s procurement policy and the level of fairness in a 
procurement decision. 
 
Hypothesis 1d: There is a positive relationship between the existence of a code of conduct for 
“supplier distributive justice” in a buying firm’s procurement policy and the level of fairness in a 
procurement decision. 
 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b postulate the positive link between the presence of a code and the level 
of formalistic orientation rather than actual behaviour. This is because the survey-based primary 
method did not enable direct observation of actual human behaviour. On the other hand, hypotheses 1c 
and 1d postulate, according to an experimental design, the link between the presence of a code and 
actual human behaviours. Adopting such a multi-method approach for this study compensates for the 
limitation of the primary method and enhances the robustness of the findings. 
According to social exchange theory, if a procurement practitioner refrains from behaving 
unethically towards his or her company’s suppliers to ensure their “procedural justice” — which 
refers to the perceived fairness of that process of distribution and/or the allocation of goods/services 
(Konovsky, 2000; Lind and Tyler, 1988) — this results in the supplier’s trust, because such behaviour 
(1) signals to suppliers that they are valued and respected (Korsgaard and Roberson, 1995) and (2) 
sets clear expectations for and explanations of the process (Kim and Mauborgne, 1991). Moreover, as 
the success and value propositions suggest, suppliers would signal back their intention for further 
interactions as well, thus increasing the possibility of more interactions in the future (Heide and Miner, 
1992; Griffith et al., 2006). Similarly, a procurement practitioner’s behaviour concerning suppliers’ 
“distributive justice”, which is related to perceived fairness in rewards (Adams, 1965), would tend to 
make suppliers’ behaviours more collaborative (Griffith et al., 2006; Narasimhan et al., 2009) as well. 
Providing that such further collaborative interactions continue and are perceived positively by both 
parties, the quality of the relationship will be enhanced, for example, through the accumulation of 
trust between them (Carey et al., 2011; Krause et al., 2007; Son et al., 2016). 
Conversely, unethical behaviours undermining supplier fairness, which are related to low-
level formalistic ethical orientation, have a negative impact on the level of trust in a relationship (Hill 
et al., 2009; Kaynak et al., 2015; Leonidou et al., 2013). Such behaviours by procurement 
practitioners could be perceived by suppliers as a violation of the psychological contract, resulting in 
a sense of inequality and maltreatment (Hill et al., 2009).  The end relational outcome of such a 
violation is the erosion of trust in a buyer–supplier relationship (Hill et al., 2009). In terms of supplier 
behaviours, unfair treatment by a buyer would encourage suppliers to reduce their collaborative 
behaviours (rationality proposition), or even to take hostile actions, resulting in trust erosion (Griffith 
et al., 2006; Narasimhan et al., 2009). 
 
Hypothesis 2: A procurement practitioner’s level of formalistic ethical orientation is 
positively related to the level of trust in a buyer–supplier relationship. 
 
Trust has long been considered an important factor in the development of a successful buyer–
supplier relationship. Trust acts as a relational governance mechanism in such a relationship, 
mitigating the risk of partner opportunism associated with investment and other financial decisions 
(Narayanan et al., 2015; Ojala and Hallikas, 2006). Trust as relational governance decreases the 
transaction cost by reducing the need for costly formal contracts and repeated negotiations (Dyer and 
Chu, 2003). A sufficient level of trust also allows companies to invest less time and resources in 
monitoring each other’s activities and more resources in achieving the objectives of the relationship 
(Dyer, 1997). Past studies have, therefore, suggested that the level of trust is related to various aspects 
of supply chain performance (Capaldo and Giannoccaro, 2015; Fynes et al., 2005; Ha et al., 2011; 
Handfield and Bechtel, 2002; Handfield et al., 2009; Panayides and Lun, 2009; Wang et al., 2011). 
The following is, therefore, hypothesised: 
  
Hypothesis 3: The level of trust in a relationship is positively related to the buying firm’s 
supply chain performance. 
 
4. Research Methods 
Multi-method research refers to “a study in which the researcher collects, analyses and mixes multiple 
forms of either qualitative or quantitative data” (Creswell, 2007, p. 12). Davis et al. (2011) argued that 
the main benefit of the multi-method design is that it strengthens findings through triangulation and 
complements the limitations of the single research method. In this study, the “interpretation” multi-
method design (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998) was followed. The primary method entailed the 
analysis, using structural equation modelling (SEM), of data from a survey of procurement 
practitioners at 327 Korean manufacturing companies. Then the findings were complemented by the 
experimental design, which enabled the testing of complementary hypotheses on the impact of a code 
of conduct on “actual human behaviours,” which was not possible using the survey method alone 
(Figure I). An experimental design has been widely used in other academic fields, such as marketing, 
wherein research phenomena are manifested via human behaviours (Davis et al., 2011), enabling 
researchers to study those behaviours (Bendoly et al., 2006; Brebels et al., 2011; Mantel et al., 2006; 
Sarkar and Kumar, 2015) in dynamic business settings (Thomas, 2011; Tokar, 2010; Ancarani et al., 
2013).  
 
4.1. Survey administration  
This study’s setting consisted of companies in the Korean manufacturing sector. The names of 1,500 
manufacturing companies were obtained from the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Directory. These companies were randomly selected mainly from the automotive and electronic 
industries, because such companies rely heavily on relationships with suppliers (Krause et al., 2007). 
A postal survey was conducted to collect the data. 
 
Table 1.  
Sample characteristics 
 
 n Percentage (%) 
Firm size (employee)   
  Small (<250) 130 39.76% 
  Medium (between 250 and 500) 66 20.18% 
  Large (>500) 131 40.06% 




  Automotive 93 28.44% 
  Electronics 78 23.85% 
  Chemicals/pharmaceuticals 29 8.87% 
  Metal 29 8.87% 
  Textile 21 6.42% 
  Heavy industry 17 5.10% 
  Food & beverage 11 3.36% 
  Others 49 14.99% 




  CEO/other high-level executives 90 27.52% 
  Supply chain directors 115 35.17% 
  Operations/logistics/purchasing manager 122 37.31% 
Total 327 100% 
Notes: aProcurement function was carried by procurement practitioners with different job titles. In the cases of 




A field pretest of the questionnaire was conducted with mid-level and senior procurement 
practitioners to identify any deficiencies in its design or wording of questions (Remenyi et al., 1998). 
A key-respondent approach was used, and procurement practitioners with a minimum of three years 
of experience were targeted to ensure sufficient knowledge of the procurement policy and supplier-
related issues. Two follow-up e-mails and reminder calls resulted in 341 questionnaires being returned 
(a response rate of 22.73%). Discarding of questionnaires with an excessive amount of missing data 
left 327 usable ones for hypothesis testing (Tables 1 and 2). Non-response bias was assessed by 
testing the mean differences between early and late respondents on all items (Armstrong and Overton, 
1977). There was no significant mean difference (p ≤ 0.05) among the items, suggesting that non-
response bias was not a problem for this study. 
 
Table 2.  
Correlations and descriptive statistics 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.Procurement policy with supplier PJ code (PJ) 1       
2.Procurement policy with supplier DJ code (DJ) 0.405*** 1      
3.Formalistic ethical orientation procurement practitioner (EOP) 0.141** 0.232*** 1     
4.Trust (TR) 0.512*** 0.386*** 0.123** 1    
5.Buying firm’s supply chain performance (SCP) 0.280*** 0.251*** 0.144** 0.363*** 1   
6.Sales (USD Million) 0.067 0.073 -0.001 0.014 0.070 1  
7.Number of employee 0.028 0.043 -0.014 -0.026 0.089 0.853*** 1 
Mean 4.720 5.800 4.500 5.210 4.928 233.892 2163.440 
S.D. 0.659 0.935 1.151 1.094 0.753 1430.125 11587.590 
Notes: p ≤ 0.1*, p ≤ 0.05**, p ≤ 0.01*** 
4.2. Measurement development 
To ensure the quality of the measures for this research, we endeavoured, where possible, to use either 
established measures or those adapted from the extant literature. All of the items used were measured 
on a 7-point Likert scale (see Appendix A).  
The “formalistic ethical orientation of the procurement practitioner” was measured using a 
scenario approach adopted from that of Brady and Wheeler (1996). The main advantage of this 
approach is that it enables researchers to “standardise the social stimulus across respondents and make 
the decision-making situation more real” (Alexander and Becker, 1978, p. 103).  
First, the respondents were required to read three scenarios related to unfair procurement 
practices: (1) early termination of supplier contract, (2) non-compliance with co-operation agreement, 
and (3) delay of payment to supplier (Appendix B). As suggested by Cavanagh and Fritzsche (1985), 
the scenarios were carefully constructed using real-life cases compiled by the Korea Fair Trade 
Commission. The respondents were then presented with three statements, representing different ways 
of assessing these scenarios, and were asked to rate them on a scale of 1 to 7, indicating the extent of 
similarity with their own assessment of the scenarios (Brady and Wheeler, 1996). For example, if a 
respondent indicated a low level of similarity between his own assessment and the first statement on 
unfair procurement scenarios, that is, “this decision is necessary for the competitiveness of our 
company”, this suggested that the respondent perceived the scenarios as unfair and unethical, which in 
turn suggested a high level of formalistic orientation. 
In terms of “the code of conduct for fair supplier treatment” construct, due to the lack of 
existing measures, a new seven-item scale was developed using the methods of Gerbing and 
Anderson (1988). An initial pool of eight items was collected based on field interviews with 
procurement practitioners and publicly available codes of conduct for the fair treatment of suppliers. 
These items were then reviewed by three academics for content validity, followed by an exploratory 
factor analysis to determine the number of dimensions underlying the construct (Appendix C). The 
results suggested two factors, which were named as (1) code for supplier procedural justice and (2) 
code for supplier distributive justice. Confirmatory factor analysis was then performed to assess the 
unidimensionality of the new scales; the results indicated the absence of any issue. In the final step, 
the reliability of the new scales was assessed using Cronbach’s α; again, the results suggested that 
there was no reliability issue. 
In order to operationalise the trust construct, the two-dimensions approach (benevolence and 
competence) suggested by Singh and Sirdeshmukh (2000) was used. Trust, in the context of this study, 
would be mainly of benevolence, which refers to each member’s holding of others’ interests ahead of 
their self-interests (Singh and Sirdeshmukh, 2000), rather than of competence, which refers to each 
member’s fulfilling promised tasks in a reliable and honest manner (Singh and Sirdeshmukh, 2000). 
For this reason, a four-item scale measuring the benevolence dimension of trust was adapted from 
existing studies. The four items were openness (Ha et al., 2011; Squire et al., 2009; Svensson, 2001), 
liking (Swan et al., 1988), honesty (Ambrose et al., 2010; Arranz, and Arroyabe, 2012; Hill et al., 
2009; Swan et al., 1988), and respect (Ha et al., 2011; Svensson, 2001). 
Regarding the measurement items for the buyer’s supply chain performance, performance 
measures, which have been used to measure the performance implications of relationship variables 
such as trust (e.g. Fynes et al., 2005; Ha et al., 2011; Nyaga and Whipple, 2011), were adopted. The 
five-items measuring a buyer’s supply chain performance were manufacturing cost (Ha et al., 2011; 
Peng et al., 2011), order-fulfilment lead time (Ha et al., 2011; Handfield et al., 2009; Schoenherr and 
Swink, 2012), order fill rate (Ha et al., 2011; Schoenherr and Swink, 2012), inventory turnover (Peng 
et al., 2011; Schoenherr and Swink, 2012), and operational flexibility (Ha et al., 2011; Schoenherr and 
Swink, 2012). 
 
4.3. Control variables 
To control for other possible effects, the following three variables were included in the model: job 
level, sales volume, and number of employees. Job level’s effect on ethical orientation was controlled 
for because senior procurement practitioners would be more likely to comply with codes and policies 
(Callan, 1992). Firm size, in terms of sales volume and number of employees, was controlled for due 
to larger companies’ better supply chain performance resulting from their extensive resource bases 
(Tsai, 2001) and their relatively greater power in the buyer–supplier relationship (Villena et al., 2011). 
 
4.4. Measurement validity and reliability 
The convergent validity, discriminant validity, and reliability of the constructs were assessed using 
AMOS version 20 (Tables 3 and 4). First, the convergent validity was assessed by examining the 
factor loadings; all were greater than 0.5 (range: 0.534 ~ 0.927). The average variance extracted 
(AVE) values ranged from 0.535 to 0.712, all exceeding the cut-off value of 0.5, indicating the 
results’ strong support for convergent validity. The measures’ reliability was then assessed using 
composite reliabilities. All of the values exceeded 0.7, suggesting that there was no significant 
reliability issue in the measures. To assess discriminant validity, the square-rooted AVEs for each 
factor were compared with the correlations between them. The results showed that all of the square-
rooted AVEs were greater than the correlations (Table 4), thereby confirming the absence of 
significant discriminant validity issues in the measures used. 
 
Table 3.  
Construct analysis 
Construct AVE* C.R** 
Range of factor 
loadings 
1.Procurement policy with supplier PJ code 0.535 0.746 0.618 ~ 0.798 
2 Procurement policy with supplier DJ code 0.572 0.732 0.649 ~ 0.822 
3.Formalistic ethical orientation procurement practitioner 0.562 0.700 0.534 ~ 0.859 
4.Trust 0.712 0.854 0.720 ~ 0.927 
5.Buying firm’s supply chain performance 0.553 0.787 0.629 ~ 0.836 
Notes: * Average variance extracted, ** Composite reliability 
χ2 = 272, d.f. = 133, p = 0.000 CFI = 0.952, and GFI = 0.921, AGFI = 0.888, TLI = 0.938 and RMSEA = 0.057 
 
Table 4.  
Construct level correlation analysis 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1.Procurement policy with supplier PJ code 1.000 - - - - 
2 Procurement policy with supplier DJ code 0.291 1.000 - - - 
3.Formalistic ethical orientation procurement practitioner 0.022 0.098 1.000 - - 
4.Trust 0.475 0.162 0.001 1.000 - 
5.Buying firm’s supply chain performance 0.159 0.071 0.006 0.142 1.000 
Notes: n = 327 observations 
   
4.5. Common method bias 
Given that self-reported data were used and that the same respondents answered the questions on both 
performance and its determinants, common method bias (CMB) was a possibility (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). Several steps were taken in the data collection process to avoid such bias. As an initial step, 
detailed information on the necessary qualifications of key informants was provided in the 
questionnaires to ensure that the informants were mid-level and senior procurement practitioners with 
a minimum of three years of experience. Second, the respondents were assured that their identities 
would remain anonymous (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
Two statistical tests — (1) Harman’s one-factor test and (2) the marker variable technique — 
were conducted to determine the existence of CMB. First, the un-rotated factor solution showed that 
the largest factor accounted for 32.47%, which suggested that CMB was an unlikely problem 
(Malhotra et al., 2005). This was then followed by the marker variable technique (Lindell and 
Whitney, 2001), whereby the marker variable “information sharing,” which had little theoretical 
relationship with the other constructs in the main model, was introduced. The results suggested that 
the marker variable was not significantly correlated with any other constructs (−0.050 to −0.139; p ≤ 
0.01). Furthermore, the correlations between the constructs in the original model remained significant 
after controlling for the effect of the marker variable, which fact supported the findings of the first test.  
 
4.6. Experimental design and data collection for the secondary method 
In this study’s context, our experimental design and data collection enabled us to directly investigate 
how a code of conduct could cause an individual to behave more fairly towards his or her exchange 
partner; this complements the findings from the primary method.  
The experiment for this study was conducted with 120 undergraduate students (56 male and 
64 female: average age: 22.9 years) from a Korean business school as subjects. Ideally, an experiment 
of this nature should be conducted with real practitioners for the best possible results. However, 
students have been frequently used for OM/SCM experiment-based studies (i.e., Bolton et al., 2004; 
Kremer et al., 2010; Loch and Wu, 2008), owing to practical reasons such as the greater resource 
requirement when using practitioners as subjects (Ribbink and Grimm, 2014). Despite this, there is 
some empirical evidence suggesting that using students as subjects does not harm the generalisability 
of findings provided that the experiments are well designed (Bendoly et al., 2006; Ribbink and 
Grimm, 2014). For example, researchers reported negligible differences between students and 
professional subject groups, for example, in terms of perception on managerial promotion issues 
(Heisler and Gemmill, 1978) and average net payoff as the reaction to the difficulty of the task 
(Montmarquette et al., 2004).   
The students were randomly assigned to one of four groups: three treatment groups and one 
control group. The subjects in the treatment groups were then given a vignette on procurement 
decision-making, including a summary of the procurement policy of a fictitious company containing a 
code of conduct for the fair treatment of suppliers. The procurement policies for groups 1 (n=30) and 
2 (n=30) contained codes for supplier procedural justice and distributive justice, respectively. The 
policy for group 3 (n=30) contained a code for both. In contrast, the participants in the control group 
(group 4, n=30) were given the same vignette with the same procurement policy but without the 
section containing a code. In order to investigate actual procurement behaviour, the participants were 
asked to make a decision on the vignette wherein the buyer could coerce an unfair discount from the 
supplier (Appendix B).  
To ensure that the manipulation worked as intended (Hartmann and Moeller, 2014; Hora and 
Klassen, 2013), a pretest was conducted using a small number of students prior to the actual 
experiment. The students were randomly given one of two types of procurement policy: one 
containing a code for supplier procedural justice and the other containing a code for distributive 
justice. They were then asked to identify procedural and distributive justice-related codes from the 
policy they had read by answering the seven survey questions used to determine the presence of code 
of conduct for fair supplier treatment. The results of the manipulation check suggested that the 
participants who had read a specific code had a higher probability of detecting the presence of such a 
code in the procurement policy Table (5).  Additionally, the independent variable for this experiment 
— “the existence of a code” — was not a latent variable; therefore, its manipulation was direct and 
straightforward. For these reasons, it was concluded that there was no internal validity issue in the 
study design. 
 
Table 5.  
Manipulation check results 
Treatment 
Existence of justice code in 
procurement policy 
f  
The participants who read the procurement policy with the code of 
conduct for supplier procedural justice 
4.075 (3.800†) 8.667***
The participants who read the procurement policy with the code of 
conduct for supplier distributional justice 
4.350 (3.777†) 10.015***
†Without code of conduct   
 
5. Analysis and Results 
5.1. Structural model analysis 
Before assessing the path coefficients, the model fit was evaluated. The indices indicated a good fit of 
the model with the data (χ2 = 353, d.f. = 189, p = 0.000, CFI = 0.952, RMSEA = 0.052, GFI = 0.913, 
AGFI = 0.884 and NFI = 0.903) (Table 6 and Figure 2). First, H1a and H1b postulated that a positive 
relationship existed between the existence of a code of conduct and the level of formalistic ethical 
orientation of a procurement practitioner. The path coefficient for H1b (0.384, p ≤ 0.01) was positive 
and significant. This finding suggested that the code of conduct for the distributive justice aspect of 
supplier fairness influenced the individual ethical orientation to become more formalistic. However, 
the path coefficient for H1b was insignificant, suggesting that there was no significant relationship 
between the existence of the code for procedural justice and the procurement practitioner’s level of 
formalistic ethical orientation. Next, H2, postulating a positive relationship between the level of 
formalistic ethical orientation and the level of trust in the buyer–supplier relationship, was examined. 
The path coefficient was significant (0.344, p ≤ 0.05), proving support for H2. This suggested that if a 
procurement practitioner’s ethical orientation leans more towards formalistic, his or her resulting fair 
behaviour towards suppliers fosters trust in the relationship. The final hypothesis from the primary 
method (H3) postulated a positive relationship between the level of trust in the relationship and the 
supply chain performance of a buying firm. The results provided support for this. 
 
Table 6.  
Path analysis results 




H1a PJ  EOP 0.085 0.104 0.097 Not support 
H1b DJ  EOP 0.384*** 0.494 0.097 Support 
H2 EOP  TR 0.344** 0.188 0.128 Support 
H3 TR SCP 0.209*** 0.375 0.036 Support 
Notes: p ≤ 0.1*, p ≤ 0.05**, p ≤ 0.01*** 
χ2 = 353, d.f. = 189, CFI = 0.952, GFI = 0.913, AGFI = 0.884, NFI = 0.903, RMSEA = 0.052 
† Standardized estimate, †† Standard error 
1. Job position => “ethical orientation” was significant (B= .249***)  
2. Sales (B = -0.042) and size (B = 0.147) => supply chain performance was not significant. 
  
 
Notes: p ≤ 0.1**, p ≤ 0.05**, p ≤ 0.01***, † Standardized estimate, †† Standard error 
Figure 2. Path analysis results 
 
5.2. Mediation analysis 
In this study, we hypothesised that the “procurement practitioner’s formalistic ethical orientation” 
fully mediates the relationship between a “code of conduct for fair supplier treatment” and “trust.” In 
order to test this, we used the bootstrapping method recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 
2008) with 2,000 sampling iterations. As evident from Table 7, the direct effect between “code for 
supplier procedural justice” and “trust” was significant; however, the indirect effect was found to be 
insignificant at p < 0.05, suggesting no mediation. Conversely, the direct effect of “code for supplier 
procedural justice” on “trust” was not significant, but the indirect effect was found to be significant. 
This supports our hypotheses regarding the full-mediation role of the practitioner’s formalistic ethical 
orientation. 
Table 7. 
Mediation effect results 
 Total effect Direct effect  Indirect effect Result 
PJEOPTR 0.696 0.692*** 0.004 No mediation 
DJEOPTR 0.106 0.071 0.035** Full mediation 
Notes: p ≤ 0.1*, p ≤ 0.05**, p ≤ 0.01*** 
  
To assess the robustness of the proposed model, it was compared with competing models, 
which were the (1) direct model (Model 2) and the (2) partial mediation model (Model 3), using the 
criteria suggested by Paulraj et al. (2008) (Table 8). The direct model (Model 2) had an acceptable fit; 
however, only one of four paths was significant. Model 3 had an acceptable fit; however, its fit 
indices (CFI, NNFI, and RMSEA) were lower than those of the proposed model. Furthermore, two of 
four paths were non-significant, indicating that the original model is better. Although the explained 
variance in the outcome variable (buyer’s supply chain performance) was marginally higher, the 
results collectively provided strong evidence for the superiority of the proposed model. Furthermore, 
because the main model was nested within the competing model, their χ2 values were compared (Rust 
et al., 1995). The χ2 difference was not statistically significant (differences of χ2 = 4.4, d.f. = 3, p > 
0.1), suggesting that the main model fit the data at least as well as the less restricted, partial mediation 
model. In sum, these results support the notion that the procurement practitioner’s ethical orientation 
is a full mediator.  
Table 8.  




Direct model  
(Model 2) 




   
PJ EOP 0.104  0.070 
DJ EOP 0.494***  0.431*** 
EOP  TR 0.188** -0.061 -0.037 
TR  SCP 0.375*** 0.383*** 0.393*** 
PJ  TR  0.084 0.177 
DJ  TR  0.502 0.568 
    
Model fit indices    
    
χ2 353 360.8 357.4 
d.f. 189 191 186 
CFI 0.952 0.950 0.949 
GFI 0.913 0.910 0.909 
AGFI 0.884 0.880 0.877 
NFI 0.903 0.900 0.901 
RMSEA 0.052 0.052 0.053 
PNFI 0.738 0.744 0.726 
AIC 481.046 484.808 491.443 
CAIC 787.604 781.786 812.370 
    
Variance explained (R2)    
Supply chain performance 0.154 0.160 0.169 
Notes: p ≤ 0.1*, p ≤ 0.05**, p ≤ 0.01*** 
 
 
5.3. Behavioural experiment (secondary analysis) 
To test H1c and H1d, which postulated a direct link between the presence of two different types of code 
and an individual’s actual behaviour (procurement decision-making), ANOVA tests were conducted 
using SPSS 20. As discussed earlier, the amount of the discount requested from the supplier was used 
as a measure of the fairness in a procurement decision. The results suggested that there was a 
significant difference in the amount of discount requested by the subjects among the different groups 
(F (3, 116)=9.967, p<0.05) (Table 9). In order to establish the between-group difference, a post-hoc 
analysis followed. The results of the post-hoc analysis supported H1d. This means that the subjects in 
Group 2, who had read the procurement policy with the code for supplier distributive justice, made a 
significantly fairer decision by asking for significantly less discount from the supplier than did those 
from Group 4 (the control group), who had read the policy without any code (1.167 lower than control 
group, p<0.05). On the other hand, the subjects from Group 1, who had read the policy with the code 
for supplier procedural justice, did not exhibit any significantly fairer behaviour in comparison to 
those from Group 4 (the control group). This means that H1c was not supported (Table 9). 
Table 9.  











(I – J) 
Group 1 
The participants who read the procurement policy with the code 
of conduct for supplier procedural justice 
 
3.733  (1.760) 
Group 2 
Group 1 -0.666 
Group 2 
The participants who read the procurement policy with the code 
of conduct for supplier distributional justice 
 
3.067  (1.530) 
Group 3 0.033 
Group 3 
The participants who read the procurement policy with the code 
of conduct for supplier procedural & distributional justice 
 
3.033 (1.790) 
Group 4 -1.167** 
Group 4 
The participants who read the procurement policy without the 
code of conduct 
 
4.233 (1.942) 
†F (3, 116) = 9.967, p<0.05 
††Amount of discount to coerce lower = fairer; (1: no discount – 4: 15% discount – 7: 30% discount) 
††† From LSD; SD = 0.455 
 
6. Conclusion and Implications 
 
6.1. Theoretical contributions 
An increasing number of companies have started to make efforts to treat their suppliers fairly as part 
of wider CSR initiatives (Liu et al., 2012; Kim, 2013). To the best of our knowledge, however, only a 
few studies have investigated the performance implications of the fair treatment of suppliers (e.g., 
Brandon-Jones et al., 2010). Therefore, the present study sought to fill this gap by investigating 
whether such efforts in the form of a code of conduct would bring performance benefits to buying 
firms. The reason for choosing a code of conduct is that it is one of the most often employed means of 
achieving fair supplier treatment (Preuss, 2009). In addition to this, this study also aimed, by focusing 
on the trust-fostering role of the behaviours resulting from a code, to answer the question of why fair 
supplier treatment in the form of a code of conduct would pay off for the buying companies.  
As the primary method, the organisational climate theory was used as a first theoretical lens 
through which to investigate the relationship between the existence of a code and the level of 
formalistic ethical orientation. As mentioned earlier, if a firm has such a code of conduct embedded in 
its procurement policy, a procurement practitioner’s ethical orientation would be expected to become 
more formalistic and that therefore, ethical behaviours would be both greater in number and more 
purely ethical in their nature. The results from the primary method suggest that the relationship for a 
code for supplier distributive justice (H1b) was significant; however, the relationship for a code for 
supplier procedural justice (H1a) was not supported.  
Likewise, the results from the secondary method, wherein the link between the existence of a 
code and the level of fairness in procurement was investigated, also support H1d (distributive justice) 
only. This means that the subjects who were exposed to a code for supplier distributive justice 
exhibited significantly fairer procurement behaviours than did the others who had not been thus 
exposed.  
A possible explanation for this can be found in the nature of the behaviours that a code of 
conduct is intended to influence. In order for a code to become effective, it should cover a sufficient 
range of behaviours and contain related detailed guidelines (Badenhorst, 1994; Tucker et al., 1999). 
This is because members tend to seek a reference point from the firm’s code when faced with 
ethically ambiguous situations. A code for supplier procedural justice (H1a and H1c) is intended to 
regulate procurement practitioners’ behaviours, which are “process oriented”, with regard to the ways 
in which they would engage with suppliers in various aspects of the procurement process. For 
example, one of the most frequently mentioned behaviours during our fieldwork was that of a “buyer 
not listening to suppliers’ concerns and feedback”. It would be difficult for a buying firm to draft an 
effective code detailing, with explicit guidelines, all eventualities of such abstract interactions.   
The main consequence of this would be a code with high-level ambiguity, containing, for 
example, general statements covering principles only. Such codes would be less likely to provide a 
procurement practitioner with an explicit reference point when needed, which explains the 
insignificant relationship with the level of formalistic ethical orientation. Similarly, this may explain 
why the group that had the code for procedural justice did not exhibit fairer behaviour than those from 
the control group. Moreover, monitoring compliance with a code having high-level ambiguity would 
be costly and impractical. If practitioners were aware that detecting and punishing breaches of such 
codes is difficult, some members would be less likely to abide by the code; in other words, it would 
undermine its own effectiveness. These findings are similar to those of Goebel et al. (2012), who 
found that a code of conduct lacking tangible and specific actions had only limited impact on 
procurement behaviours. Conversely, a code for supplier distributive justice ensures fair returns to 
suppliers, and its breaches would normally result in imminent and tangible losses for suppliers (such 
as monetary losses). Such behaviours, in comparison with the code for procedural justice, are much 
more explicit and have clearer consequences. Therefore, drafting an effective code and monitoring its 
compliance with such behaviours would be relatively straightforward, which fact explains the positive 
link between the code for supplier distributive justice and (1) the level of formalistic ethical 
orientation and (2) the level of fairness in procurement decisions. This leads to the first theoretical 
contribution of this paper, that the efficacy of a code of conduct (a form of the ethical climate of an 
organisation) is contingent on the nature of the behaviours it is meant to regulate.  
As a second step, the relationship between the level of formalistic ethical orientation and trust 
in the buyer–supplier relationship (H2) was investigated, followed by the investigation of the third 
hypothesis, which postulated a positive relationship between trust and a buying firm’s supply chain 
performance. The results supported both H2 and H3. These findings are similar to those of Brandon-
Jones et al. (2010), providing further empirical support for buyers’ performance benefits from fair 
supplier treatment. These findings constitute the second contribution of this paper, which is a 
theoretical explanation for why fair supplier treatment can also be beneficial for buyers. According to 
social exchange theory, fair behaviours by a buyer would encourage its suppliers to engage in further 
interactions, the resulting relational outcome being trust accumulation (Heide and Miner, 1992; 
Griffith et al., 2006). Furthermore, trust is an important factor for the competitiveness of a buyer, 
since it is one of the enablers of a successful buyer-supplier relationship (Dyer and Chu, 2000; 
Wathne and Heide, 2004). In summary, the findings in this paper empirically support the idea that the 
fair treatment of suppliers would “pay-off” a buying firm, which is in line with the findings of 
Brandon-Jones et al (2010). 
 
6.2. Managerial implications 
The findings herein constitute useful managerial insights for buying firms. There is growing 
evidence, including the findings in this paper, that the fair treatment of suppliers can be beneficial for 
buying firms. A fair supplier treatment agenda, however, is still being nudged to buying firms by 
external stakeholders, such as governments and professional organisations (e.g. Lee, 2012). Based on 
this study’s findings, therefore, which suggest that fair supplier treatment does pay off for buying 
firms, senior managers should start to consider making “fair supplier treatment” a part of their 
existing social sustainability initiatives. One way of doing this is by developing a related code of 
conduct and incorporating it into a procurement policy. Doing this provides a company not only with 
a means of monitoring the behaviours of its procurement people but also with useful guidelines 
related to their supplier-facing behaviours. Moreover, it also manifests and communicates the firm’s 
commitment to fair supplier treatment to stakeholders, both internally and externally. However, 
whereas such a code can influence the behaviours of procurement practitioners, it is effective, as 
discussed, only for behaviours related to supplier distributive justice.   
If a buyer wishes to address the issue of supplier procedural justice (such as broadening of 
supplier participation in decision-making), approaches other than those entailing codes need to be 
considered. In a buyer–supplier relationship, procedural justice is manifested through clarity of 
expectations and the extent of involvement in, and explanation of, decision-making procedures (Kim 
and Mauborgne, 1998; Narasimhan et al., 2013). This requires, therefore, more substantial approaches 
for improvement of the processes and routines of interaction with suppliers. One method a buying 
firm could consider is increasing the level of formal socialisation with its suppliers. This would 
require creating specific structural formats for engagement, such as regular meetings and conferences, 
or perhaps cross-functional teams (Cousins et al., 2006). 
 
6.3. Limitations and future research 
This study has the following limitations, which could open up several avenues for future 
research. First, the experimental design included the utilisation of undergraduate students. A similar 
experiment-based study using real procurement practitioners would provide additional insights on the 
findings of this study. Second, this study used a cross-sectional survey; considering that the ethical 
orientation it presents take considerable time in their development, a longitudinal research design 
would add new insights to the findings. Third, the effect of firm size in the mediation of a formalistic 
ethical orientation was found to be significant but rather small (0.035**). This might suggest that 
some other mediator(s) can explain the relationships between the presence of a code and mutual trust. 
For example, Litzky and Greenhaus (2007) argued that a code of conduct’s effectiveness depends on 
an organisation’s willingness to explicitly communicate the code’s terms, as well as to reward and 
punish accordingly. A study incorporating additional interaction effects of such factors would provide 
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Appendix A. Measurement items 
 
Scales Sources 
Code of conduct for supplier procedural justice in procurement policy 
 
(1: Strongly disagree – 7: Strongly agree) 
 
(1) My company’s procurement policy has a code encouraging us to take 
the supplier’s concerns and feedback into consideration for decision 
making  
(2) My company’s procurement policy has a code requiring us to increase 
supplier involvement in the process of drawing up a contract  
(3) My company’s procurement policy has a code requiring us to increase 
supplier involvement in decision making, which is related to sharing 
rewards from a relationship  
(4) My company’s procurement policy has a code requiring us to increase 
greater supplier involvement in decision making, which is related to 






Code of conduct for supplier distributive justice in the procurement 
policy  
 
(1: Strongly disagree – 7: Strongly agree) 
 
(1) My company’s procurement policy has a code discouraging 
unnecessary delay of payment to the supplier 
(2) My company’s procurement policy has a code discouraging 
unnecessary return of materials/components to the supplier 







Ethical orientation of procurement practitioner (see Appendix II for 
the scenarios)  
 
(1: Very similar to my way of thinking – 7: Not at all similar to my way of 
thinking) 
 
(1) This decision is necessary for the competitiveness of our company 
(2) This decision is necessary for the financial performance of our 
company 
(3) This decision is not acceptable, since it is a breach of the contract and 
trust (reverse coded) 





(1: Strongly disagree – 7: Strongly agree) 
 
(1) We feel that our firm and the supplier are open and do not conceal 
business objectives 
(2) We feel that our firm and the supplier have a positive attitude in the 
relationship 
(3) We feel that our firm and the supplier are honest each other 
(4) We feel that our firm and the supplier are concerned with mutual 
respect 
Ambrose, Marshall, 
and Lynch, 2010;  
Ha, Park, and Cho, 
2011;  
Hill et al., 2009;  
Svensson, 2001; 
Swan et al., 1988 
Buying firm’s supply chain performance  
 
(1: Far below competitors – 7: Far above competitors) 
 
(1) Manufacturing cost of our company is  
(2) Order fulfilment lead time of our company is  
(3) Order fulfilment rate of our company is  
(4) Inventory turnover ratio of our company is  
(5) Operations flexibility of our company is  
Frohlich and 
Westbrook, 2001;  
Ha, Park, and Cho, 
2011; Handfield et 
al., 2009; Peng, 
Schroeder, and Shah, 




Appendix B. Scenarios  
 
(1) Early supplier contract termination (Ethical orientation) 
 
Your company is one of the largest companies in the industry. Your company has recently re-signed a 
supply contract with its previous supplier, B, via a competitive bid process. Supplier B has been 
supplying components to your company for more than 10 years and is regarded as a close business 
partner. A few weeks ago, however, you were approached by Supplier C proposing that it could 
supply similar components currently supplied by B, but 15% cheaper. Indeed, this is a very interesting 
proposal potentially resulting in a big cost saving. Additionally, you have heard from various sources 
that Supplier C is a rising star in the field providing high-quality components with very aggressive 
pricing. Early termination of the contract with Supplier B would result in a breach of contract, but 
considering the buyer power of your company (one of the largest in the industry), it is very unlikely 
that Supplier B would actually take legal action against you and jeopardise a potential business 
opportunity. For this reason, your company has decided to switch to Supplier C. 
 
(2) Non-compliance with a cooperation agreement (Ethical orientation) 
 
Your company is one of the largest companies in the industry. Your company has recently signed a 
supply contract with Supplier B. As part of the deal, your company and Supplier B have agreed to 
share information about each other’s products. Since then, upon your company’s requests, Supplier B 
has been sharing various information with your company, such as technical details about its products 
and its new product development line-up. Your company, however, has been rather reluctant to 
respond to similar requests from Supplier B. This is because the company has recently become aware 
that Supplier B has been doing business with your competitors, C and D. Indeed, your company is 
very concerned about the possibility of shared information leaking to its competitors through Supplier 
B. In the end, your company has decided to honour the agreement but at very superficial level, leaving 
out core information. The management of your company believes that there is not much Supplier B 
can do about it, since your company is one of the most influential buyers in the field. For Supplier B, 
information about your company’s current and new products line-up is crucial, since it can be used for 
long-range planning. For this reason, Supplier B has been repeatedly asking your company to honour 
the agreement by sharing information about its products. 
 
(3) Supplier payment delay (Ethical orientation) 
 
Supplier B has been supplying components to your company for more than 10 years and is regarded 
as a close business partner. Recently, your company has been going through a challenging time due to 
the economic downturn and ever-increasing competition. It has now become apparent that meeting the 
profit target for this quarter is highly unlikely. As a result, share price fall looks inevitable and the top 
management looks increasingly nervous about the prospect of facing its angry shareholders. As one of 
the measures to make up the shortfall in profit, the management of the company has decided to delay 
payments to some of its suppliers and Supplier B is one of them. It is almost certain that this decision 
by your company will put Supplier B in a very difficult situation, since the current recession seems to 
have hurt everyone in the industry. 
 
(4) Procurement decision making 
 
Company B manufactures car headlight systems and supplied 10,000 units (KRW 300,000 each) to 
your company last year. You are a procurement manager for your company. At present, many 
companies in the automotive industry are going through a tough period due to the economic downturn 
and ever-increasing competition from overseas. In response to this, there is a huge internal drive in 
your company for further cost-cutting, including purchase cost review. Ahead of a contract renewal 
with Company B, you and your team have been instructed to be aggressive on price negotiation.  
 
- Your company procures headlight units from multiple suppliers.  
- You are aware that the majority of Company B’s sales comes from the business with your 
company.  
- Recently, you have heard a rumour that Company B is going through financial hardship. 
- During your last appraisal, you discussed your promotion with your line manager. 
 
How much of a discount would you request?  
 
(1) No discount is requested.  
(2) Request 5% discount. (Your company can save KRW 150,000,000, B loses KRW 150,000,000) 
(3) Request 10% discount. (Your company can save KRW 300,000,000, B loses KRW 300,000,000) 
(4) Request 15% discount. (Your company can save KRW 450,000,000, B loses KRW 450,000,000) 
(5) Request 20% discount. (Your company can save KRW 600,000,000, B loses KRW 600,000,000) 
(6) Request 25% discount. (Your company can save KRW 750,000,000, B loses KRW 750,000,000) 
(7) Request 30% discount. (Your company can save KRW 900,000,000, B loses KRW 900,000,000) 
 
Note: Your savings and B’s loss is based on 10,000 units. $1 US = KRW 1,085 as of 01/Dec/2017) 
 










e of factor 
loadings 













* Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was followed to assess the unidimensionality of the new scales; the 
results indicated the absence of any issue (χ2 = 46.6, d.f. = 13, p = 0.000, CFI = 0.945, GFI = 0.959, AFGI = 0.913, 
TLI = 0.911 and RMSEA = 0.089).  
* The cut-off point of 0.6 was used for this study (Aron et al., 2013; Hair et al., 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
